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SOME REMARKS ABOUT RATIONALITY* 
by 
MAX BLACK 
1.  Ambiguities of rationality. The original title of my talk, "The Limitations 
of Rationality," immediately raises some troublesome questions. If we knew what 
we intended to mean by "rationality" we might reasonably hope to become clearer 
about its "limitations." But both terms are unclear and "rationality" alludes to a 
vast range of topics. 
In the context, rational such-and-such the second position can be occupied by 
'belief,' 'action,' 'choice,' 'procedure,' 'person,' and many other words. Ignoring 
this plethora of related uses,. I shall consider only some questions about rational 
choice, though glancing occasionally at related questions about rational belief. I 
would like to become clearer about what we mean and reasonably ought to mean 
when we approvingly distinguish some particular choice as "rational" rather than 
"less than rational" or even "irrational." 
Borrowing a useful idea from Professor W .B. Gallie, we might call 'rationality' 
an essentially contested notion. This word and its cognates are almost always acco­
lades of approval: except in certain advanced circles, engaged in transvaluing current 
values, it is a strong mark of esteem to be deemed to have chosen r.ationally. But 
there have lonj!been strenuous disagreements about the proper basis for such praise: 
competing- and opposed traditions still contest the possession of this important 
honorific. 
2. The instrumental conception. Bertrand Russell once said: '"Reason' has a 
perfectly clear and precise meaning [indeed ! ] .  It signifies the choice of the right 
means that you wish to achieve.' It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of 
ends."1 Suitably elaborated, this view reduces "Reason" or rationality to correct 
reasoning from accepted but unexamined premisses. Like so many of Russell's pro· 
vocative obiter dicta, this one has the merit of being quite clear: the scope of ration­
ality extends only to "right-· or shall we say, sufficiently satisfactory --means; the 
end in view is beyond rational criticism. Yet surely it is correct to condemn precau­
tions against snake-bite when one has conclusive reasons for thinking that no snakes 
can be encountered? Not so if Russell's recommended use of rationality is accepted: 
carrying anti-venom is eminently reasonably if one fears, rightly or wrongly, to be 
bitten by a snake. (It is hard to imagine what "end" might be reasonably achieved 
by protection against non-existent snakes--perhaps reduction of a neurotic's anxi· 
ety?) 
This instrumental conception enjoins praise for some decidedly obnoxious under­
takings: Hitler, given his monstrous "ends", would qualify as eminently rational, 
considering his efficiency in incinerating Jews and other "enemies of the Reich." 
(Would we be <mtent tn call Hitler rational but evil? Perhaps Russell would think we 
should do so?) Still more troublesome is the incidence of "practical inconsistency" 
between an agent's accepted ends, with realization of one end excluding the real­
ization of the other. Are we to say that somebody buying air flights on planes simul­
taneously leaving for two places "rational" because he has chosen the "right" means 
to achieve each of mutually incompatible ends? If we allow ourselves to criticise 
ends, even on the strong ground of internal incoherence, we have jettisoned the 
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engaging simplicity of the purely instrumental conception. 
3. Rationality as a "concertina" word. Rationality and its cognates might be 
called concertina words: sometimes they are contracted to refer to nothing more 
than valid reasoning: it is rational to do M, as a means to some stated end, �' on the instrumental view, when and only when M is the most efficient way of achiev­
ing E (probablities, utilities and disutilities having been calculated). This comes to 
identifying rationality with the correct use of logic. But "rationality" can also swell 
to paradox. 
4. A more "hospitable" conception? Philosophers sympathetic with Aristotle's 
identification of rationality as what is essentially human, have sometimes offered 
somewhat broader and more expansive views of rationality, while not denying the 
relevance, so far as it goes, of "instrumental rationality." I shall briefly consider a 
few modern examples. 2 
In his delightful essay, "A Rational Animal,"3 Gilbert Ryle interprets the an­
cient view that man is rational to mean that man is the animal able par excellence 
to exercise "thought." The interest of his view arises from the broad extension he 
assigns to "thought," finding it "in the most hospitable sense of the word" impli­
cated in such distinctively human activities as playing games, producing and seeing 
jokes, striking bargains--and even feeling impatience or irritation (p. 419). I agree 
that such activities are distinctly human and will be ready to think otherwise only 
when I learn that Washoe, tlhat paragon of chimpanzees, has uttered some epigram 
or convicted somebody of logical fallacy. Yet Ryle's conception is too 'hospitable' 
to be serviceable as a criterion for distinguishing within distinctively human per· 
formance between the rational, the less than rational, the irrational and the merely 
·non-rational. 
In similar vein, Richard Robinson, in his fine book, An Atheist's Values,4 that 
deserves to be better known, claims that "the word 'reason' is our name for the 
ideal of thinking" (p. 105). So whenever we thinlk well (probably in something less 
than Ryle's "most hospitable" sense of "think") we are necessarily being rational. 
But then what is it to think well'? Robinson's notion, to which ] am sympathetic, is 
unsatisfyingly uninformative . 
Michael Oakeshott's lengthy essay, "Rational Conduct"5 has for its epigraph 
Coleridge's remark that "The word rational has been strangely abused of late times" 
and includes a severe castigation of un-named advocates of "rational agriculture," 
"rational diet," "rational dress/' and the like. 6 His target is any kind of recommend­
ed conduct "in which an independently premeditated end is pursued and which is 
determined solely by that end" (p. 5). But what has Oakeshott to offer in place of 
what he sees as a deplorable reliance upon prior reasoning and the use of a "deter­
minate, independent instrument" (p. 9)? Well, the following; "(T]he only significant 
way of using the word 'rational' in relation to conduct is when we mean to indicate 
...  faithfulness to the knowledge of how to conduct the activity we are engaged in" 
(p. 20, italics in the original text). More succinctly, "practical human conduct may be 
counted 'rational' in respect of its faithfulness to a knowledge of how to behave 
well" (p. 26).7 · 
I suppose a good tennis player knows how to play well and is "faithful to that 
knowledge" (tries to act on his knowledge'?);  and as much can be said for a good 
swimmer, a good drill sergeant, a good swindler, or a good anything-you-please. If 
"rationality" is to be synonymous with skill (for that is what Oakeshott's view 
seems to amount to) we hardly need that word. Rationality as "thinking.well" or 
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"behaving well"--here the concertina is at full stretch, producing that undifferen­
tiated humming that used to be called "bombination". 
5. A modest suggestion. Let us start with the modest formula that action in 
the face of uncertainty or risk shall count as rational to the extent that it is support­
ed by the agent's good reasons. (Needed distinctions and qualifications can be left 
for later.) If that unambitious and, I trust, unexceptional formula sounds circular, 
given the linguistic and con,ceptual connections between 'rational' and 'reason(s)', 
I would plead that the latter word has the advantage of being more specific and less 
mysterious than the former. It is to be hoped that however much our theories about 
the nature of rationality may differ, we have a sufficiently firm initial grasp, in 
some cases at least, of what should count as good reasons for a prospective action. 
I should be surprised if the articulation of the notion of a good reason for action 
presupposed analysis of the more controversial notion of rationality. 
6. Implicit reasons. An action is rational, I have urged, to the extent that it is 
supported by the agent's good reasons. In so saying, I did not wish to imply that an 
action properly qualifies as rational only if the doer has consciously and explicitly 
weighed the pros and cons of the action. Of course such prior deliberation frequent­
Ey occurs, given the virtual impossibility of reaching defensible dlecisions in problem­
atic situations fraught with complex and uncertain consequences. Yet it would be 
implausible to make prior deliberation a necessary condition for rational action. 
To hold otherwise would commit us, paradoxically, to claiming that a beginner at 
chess, laboriously calculating consequences of his options, shows more rationality 
than the master playing at "lightening" speed and able p_Qs1 1!9� to explain tmhesi­
tatingly the reasons that justified his choice of a move. Such retroactive reconstruc­
tion of sufficiently good reasons shows that the master player had good reasons for 
his choice, .even though he had insufficient time for calculation and deliberation. 
Such "reconstructed" reasons need not be perfect or even the best that has been 
available: one remains rational even when choosing poorly, provided that the pre­
sumptively justifying reasons are relevant and sufficiently good not to be condemn­
ed out of hand. 
Of course, acceptable reconstruction of implicit reasons needs to be distinguish· 
ed from "rationalization." Sometimes that indefensible way of making thoughtless 
decisions look respectable after the act may be hard to distinguish from admissible 
retroactive reconstruction; yet we can sometimes adequately distinguish face-saving 
from genuine justification. 
If I could, I should prefer to avoid admitting implicit reasons into the analysis 
of rationality, but I see no way to do so. 
7. A disgression on "limitations." The absence of disct11ssion about what is 
intended when the limitations of rationality are celebrated or deplored suggests 
that the notion is sufficiently cleat fat comment to be superfluous. I do not think 
so. I propose to approach t!he topic indirectly by introducing an analogy--which I 
trust may be more instructive than misleading--between a procedure of rational 
justification of action and the use of some mechanism. (This analogy has indeed 
played an important part in formulating ideals of perfect rationality.) 
Consider some fairly simple machine, say a bicycle. We can usefully distinguish 
three related but distinct components in its operation. First, and most obviously 
there is the "machine itself," a complex of components ("machine parts") con­
structed to interact determinately in ways beyond the rider's control. Of course he 
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can choose a gear, but what happens then to what has been called the "withinput"S 
is independent of the user's wishes. (Some people like to tinker with machines, 
turning them into something better or different--but that is another story.) :!Every 
machine, digital computers with their capacity to respond to a variety of "pro­
grams" not excluded, is essentially a deterministic system. 
One obvious "limitation" is at once suggested by this glimpse of the obvious: 
the notion of a universal machine is incoherent. A sausage-machine might, I suppose, 
be so constructed that it also makes shoes (by a "shift of gears," as it were) but the 
notion of a machine that can do anything whatever boggles the imagination. To be 
a machine, or a mechanism, entails specialisation and, if one wants to say so, "limit­
ation". But this necessary feature of all machine operation can hardly be regarded 
as a weakness or a defect: a machine intended to do everything would in fact do 
nothing. 
Next, and equally obviously, no machine is self-operating, but requires an "input" 
of material and energy--and at some point the intervention of a fallible, unprogram­
med human operator. (This applies to so-called "automated" factories as well as to 
our starting example of a bicycle.) Now the input, .and especially its human canpo­
nent, cannot be "predetermined" as rigidly as the mechanism itself: a bicycle's 
manufacturer cannot and does not wish to prescribe where that bicycle will be 
driven or on what roads and cannot legislate about the rider's weight or skill. Of 
course, the cha.racter of the mechanism will imply certain constraints upon the "in­
put" and the resulting performance (the "output"): too unskillful a rider will be 
unable to make the bicycle move and too obese a one will smash it. But such built­
in constraints leave a relatively wide range of indetermination for input and output, 
to be decided by the accidents of use. 
A similar point applies to the "output": the machine product will be a function, 
relatively indeterminate, of the predetermined "withinput" and the capriciously 
variable "input". Computer experts like to say, "Gargage in, garbage out,,: the 
most sophisticated computer can do no more than execute its built-in routines, 
using whatever inputs the intelligent or stupid program-writers have inserted. The 
French say it more pithily: "La plus belle dame ne peut donner plus ce qu'elle a"-· 
and the same applies to machines. 
There is good historical precedent for stressing the analogy of <i.esiderated ration· 
al procedures (regular ways of justifying actions or beliefs by good reasons) and 
mecharams: one need only to recall the traditional conception of Aristotle's syllog· 
istic as an organon (instrument), or Bacon's Novurn Organon, or Descartes' Method, 
to recall the strong and persistent interest of the great rationalistic innovators in 
inventing formal and routinized procedures that would minimize the role of human 
"sagacity" and make proof --or even discovery as some have hoped--as easy as mach­
ine-minding. Such a "method" or "instrument" can quite properly be regarded as 
an intellectual. machine, possessing the features I have previously emphasized. The 
point of inventing such a "machine" is to have a predetermined decision-procedure 
or algorithm, :reproducible by human users, or embodied in some material mechan­
ism, that can be relied upon to yield the desired outcome, with as little involvement 
of erratic human imagination and resourcefulness as may be feasible. Bacon, Des­
cartes, Leibniz, and many others have shared the dream of an •ntellectual mechan­
ism that could raise the powers of operators of modest talent to the level or the 
mechanism's inventor. (The creation of the differential a�d integral calculus, re­
quiring only mediocre skill for its use, was a spectacular triumph for this formalistic 
program.) Today we can program any well-defined decision-procedure on a digital 
computer, whose use demands only the capacity to follow explicit instructions. 
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But behind the computer th.ere still stands the fallible unprogrammed human being 
who selects the machine input and, above all, interprets the significance of its out­
put. And there's the rub! 
8. Cost-benefit analys.is. The most widely used intellectual machine of our 
times is the so-called "cost-benefit analysis. ,,9 Many influential thinkers regard it 
as the supreme embodiment of rational action in the face of risk.10 
The embodied algorithms differ, of course, from older principles of rational 
choice, in relying strongly upon subjective probabilities and utilities. Let us consider 
the following description of it: 11 
1. When we first encounter him in the decision-making situation, he L the 
decision maker] already has laid out before him the whole set of alterna­
tives from which he will choose his action ... 
2. To each alternative is attached a set of consequences ... 
3. At the outset, the decision maker has a "utility function" or a "preference­
ordering" that ranks all sets of consequences from the most preferred to 
the least preferred. 
4. The decision maker selects the alternative leading to the preferred set of 
consequences ... 
It should be added that the "consequences" in question are intended to be graded 
according to their expected utilities, as measured by the product of the utility in 
view and the subjective probability of achieving it. 
This piece of intellectual machinery is admirably simple: supplied with the act­
uarial values of all the alternatives to be considered (a breath-taking stipulation, to 
be sure)12 the decision-maker need only perform the trivial task of adopting the 
action with the highest expected utility (or, in the case of a tie, any optimal action 
i!ndifferently). This attractively simple instrument has the added ch arm of 
sufficient flexibility to admit any constellation of values, however bizarre.13 No 
wonder that cost-benefit analysis (and its near relation, "systems analysis", "linear 
programming'�, and the like) has become part of the computerised technol.ogy of 
any corporation, ministerial agency, or public body that aspires to be modishly 
"rational". But the appearance of a final solution to the �neral problem of rational 
choice is a dangerous--one might say, a vicious--illusion: the price paid for the engag. 
ing simplicity of the caluclating mechanism is the endlessly controversial and infor· 
mal--but still potentially rational! --deliberation that necessarily precedes the mach­
ine's application. All that determines the rationality of the final outcome has occur· 
red in advance of the "formality of execution" by th� cost-benefit calculation. 
9. Rationality in action: the case of the chessplayer. I propose now to con-
sider some features of what may be the best available extended example of practical 
rationality--the familiar and instructive one of a good chessplayer's behavior--in 
order to strengthen the case against regarding "instrumental rationality" or its 
sophisticated modern elaboration of "cost-benefit analysis" as a suitable paradigm 
for rationality. For surely what good chessplayers do is as close to any ideal of 
attainable if imperfect rationality that we can reasonably entertain : compared with 
decisions made in the course of a chess match, the decisions made in private life, 
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the market place or a law court are bound to appear as necessarily fumbling and 
unsatisfactory. 
The relative determinateness of the chessplayer's task of playing rationally by 
finding the Hbest move" arises, clearlY,, from the arbitrary and perfectly precise 
constraints imposed by the "rules" of "play", that generate sequences. of "legal" 
moves, normally too complex to permit exhaustive analysis. Indeed, it is easy to 
prove the surprising result that there must always be a "best,, way to play, even if 
it is beyond human power to know what the optimal strategy is.lit Thus the invar­
iable outcome of any chess game with "best moves" on both sides must follow from 
the rules: a faultless encounter must always end in a win for White, a win for Black, 
or a draw--whichever of these is always the right answer. 
But to know that this theoreticaJ "solution" exists is of no help to an actual 
player, faced �ith a bewildering multiplicity of legal moves, beyond the powers of 
even a chess genius like Fischer to analyse exhaustively. If we assume no more than 
ten reasonable possibilities in general for each move (i.e. roughly three moves to be 
considered by White, each of them leading to three reasonable replies) the number 
of possible games lasting forty moves will be of the order of 1040 (one followed by 
40 zeroes). It has been estimated that a million machines examining a billion such 
games each second and in constant operation since the solar system came into exis­
tence would by now have achieved only one ten-millionth part of the task of scrut­
iny! 15 This mechanical mode of evaluation is clearly too preposterously difficult 
to be worth considering. 
In the light of such considerations, one might reasonably conclude that Chess is 
too difficult a game to be played rationally. Yet vast numbers of human beings, of 
moderate intellectual capacity do manage to play the game with steady and deserv­
ed success. How, then, does a skillful player manage to perform this seemingly 
impossible task? 
In answering this question, we can rely upon introspective evidence or, better 
still, upon the instructive "protocols" assembled and analysed in de Groot's pioneer­
ing book.16 I have already said that a reasonably good player does not consider all 
the legal moves available to him and does not engage in extended sequential calcu­
lations of consequences except in especiaJly "criticaJ" junctures. Such essential 
simplification on the problematic situation requires what may be called a patterned 
or Gestalt-like perception of a given position: unless one is a mere beginner who 
"can't begin to imagine what should be done," one sees the relatively few "candi­
date-moves"l 7 as salient possibilities against a highly structured background. The 
skilled player does not perceive a mere aggregate of squares occupied by pieces, but 
rather features describable in the distinctive (partly qualitative, partly quantitative) 
language of chess strategy and tactics: "a weak King," "a strong center," "batteries 
of pieces," "open files," and so on. Such a patterned grasp of the situation, rein­
forced by memories of parallel situations and their outcomes, distinguishes a few 
moves as alone worth consideration and rejects others as being, at least initially, 
unworthy of consideration. 
Of course, a skillful player will proceed to calculate the likely consequences of 
each of the limited number of "candidate-moves," that are initially judged to be 
worth taking seriously. But in an actuaJ game (by contrast with the protracted ses­
sions in which masters aim at exhaustive analysis of "adjourned games") sudl analy­
sis of anticipated consequences is necessarily truncated and incomplete. It is worth 
making the further point, familiar to any good player, that such analysis may well 
modify or radically transform one's analysis of the given position: attempts to solve 
the perceived problem is apt to change one's conception of the nature of the pro-
70 
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blem. The process of rational choice is dynamic--to use a word that has perhaps been 
overworked in the literature. 
The dynamic process of finding a rational solution to a problem of decision in 
playing chess does not and <:annot occur in an intellectual vacuum: a chess player 
with a tabula rasa, wiped clean of all preconceptions and preformed convictions, 
would almost certainly succumb in short order to a "Fool's Mate" or some com­
parably ignominious fiasco. Any moderately instructed player is strongly guided by 
memories of his own previous successes and failures and, still more importantly, by 
the sifted experience of whole generations of masters. The available tradition sup­
plies defeasible general maxims, standardised routines for accomplishing particular 
sub-tasks, detailed models for the initial deployment of pieces (the "opening"), and 
much else. Such deliverances of a rich tradition can function as premisses of the re· 
quisite "practical reasoning" and usually need not be questioned, but any of them 
can be questioned and perhaps rejected in special cases. (We are far here from the 
unquestioned premisses of RusseWs model.) 
Such reliance upon traditional deliverances used in a not uncritical fashion, 
surely supplies the· good chess player with "good reasons", however inconclusive, 
for his choice: it would be emininently unreasonable to ignore the available exper­
ience of past players, however fallible and defeasible the lessons to be drawn from 
them may be. It would be absurdly irrational to rely upon rediscovering for oneself 
the best and most promising ways of playing the Sicilian Defense (an opening that 
continues to produce a flood of relevant analysis and discussion by the masters). 
The necess.ary reliance in such concrete exemplifications of practical reasoning 
on what might be called "in.dubita"--premisses stronger than mere presuppositions 
or working assumptions seems to me quite· characteristic and typical of available 
instances of extended rational choice.18 
10. Practical rationality: the ,Cuban Missile Crisis. I tum now to an incompar­
ably graver instance of practical rationality, the so-called "Cuban Missile Crisis" of 
October, 1962.19 
The circumstances were as follows: The crisis, which brought the world to the 
very brink of a nuclear holocaust, arose during the second year of J. F. Kennedy's 
term as President. Soon after his inauguration he had, in an act that he later bitter­
ly regretted, authorised the execution of the so-called "Bay of Pigs" expedition, 
that had been prepared and authorised by his predecessor: an invasion of Cuba by 
a force of some 14,000 Cuban refugees--armed and trained by the CIA and so in 
effect an American military operation. The subsequent fiasco, involving the total 
defeat of the expedition in no more than three days, worked incalculable harm to 
America's good name and to its influence in international affairs. 
This disreputable and disastrous adventure set the stage for the still more serious 
events of October 1962. Although it had been known for some time that the Soviet 
Union was supplying Cuba with arms, American protests at ambassadorial and high­
er levels had been countered by explicit and categorical assurances that Russian 
military aid to Cuba was ex.elusively defensive in intent, supplied only to prevent a 
renewed attempt to invade Cuba and destroy its communist government--and hence 
constituted no threat to legitimate American interests. This build-up in Cuban mili­
tary strength had in effect been condoned by Kennedy, although surveillance by 
U-2 unarmed planes continued. 
In the middle of October, the position changed drastically, when the CIA gave 
Kennedy photographs showing that the Russians were actively installing missiles in 
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Cuba. The missiles, first thought to number 30, though the estimate was soon raised 
to perhaps 40, were not yet fully assembled, but would be ready for operation in 
short order. They could not plausibly be regarded as anything but offensive wea­
pons, since they included not only surface-to-air missiles ("SAM's"), which might 
perhaps be regarded as "defiensive" but also, crucially, intermediate ballistic missiles 
with ranges of over 1000 miles. Their presence so close to the United States would 
reduce the "warning time" for an attack to a matter of a few moments; indeed their 
installation would effectively outflank the American radar system that had been 
constructed as a warning network against possible attack from continental Russia. 
To underline the seriousness of the situation thus impending, it should be noted 
that the new missiles were expected to increase the total Russian firing power by as 
much as 50%. 
The situation was appallingly dangerous: each of the IBM missiles (as long ago as 
1962) carried a warhead equal in destructive power to 30 or 40 Hiroshima atom 
bombs: the experts predicted that a "first strike" in a nuclear conflict between the 
two nations, inevitably followed by a retaliatory "second strike" would produce at 
least a hundred million casualities on each side! (It is hard to realise that we really 
were on the very brink of this global horror, which might have triggered by a mis­
calculation on either side: memory is mercifully short.) How, if at all, is it possible 
to behave "rationally" in the face of such an imminent catastrophe, unparalleled in 
history, with the very survival of the human race at grave risk? 
What Kennedy actually did was to set up at once an informal group of high level 
advisors, identified as an ad hoc executive committee of the National Security 
Council (abbreviated to "EXCON"), that included Robert Kennedy, Macnamara 
(then Secretary of Defense), McCone (head of the CIA), Adlai Stevenson (then 
ambassador to the United Nations) and of course the Military chiefs. This group 
remained in almost continuous session for the crucial thirteen days until the crisis 
was eventually resolved by Khruschev's withdrawal in the face of an American 
"quarantine," a euphemism for a sea blockade and so, technically, an act of war 
against Russia. 
After reviewing much o:f the available and copious literature, I am seized with 
admiration and gratitude for Kennedy's conduct in this terrible predicament, in 
which he alone oould make the final decisions. In my judgement, ihe behaved through­
out with admirable rationality, to which we may wen owe our continued existence 
in this far from the best of all possible worlds .. A detailed examination of what 
Kennedy actually did must surely show, once again, the. enormous gulf between 
practical rationality in such situations and the available text-book models. Resisting 
strong and consistent pressure from the military advisors to resort to a "surgical 
strike" (i.e. to eliminate the missiles by aerial attack, using all the available time to 
find the best solutions that humane sagacity might recommend, deliberating refusing 
to take irreversible and potentially disastrous actions and, above all, showing an im­
aginative capacity to restructure the problem-situation, Kennedy managed some­
how to help humanity to turn the most dangerous comer in its history. 
I cannot give the Missile Crisis the detailed analysis that is still wanting--and that 
would require the Russian side of the story for full understanding. My purpose in 
recalling this grisly episode has been to illustrate the need for further attention, by 
philosophers and others, to the character of such complex decisions. We need to 
have a clearer and more acce[ptable conception of how persons, at their best, succeed 
in behaving in ways that may properly be praised as rational. I am convinced that the 
models of rational decision that should ultimately emerge from such study will 
differ substantially from those now available. 
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*Revised and abbreviated transcript of a talk given at Brockport University College 
on March 10, 1977. 
lBetrand Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics (London , 1954), preface. 
Similar dicta abound in the literature. 
2Well-developed theories of what is sometimes called "substantive rationality" 
are hard to find. But see, for instance, J. D. Mabbott, "Reason and Desire" in R. F, 
Deardon and others, eds, Education and the Development of Reason (London, 19-
72), pp. 320-331 for a discussion of the rationality of criticising ends. 
3GiJbert Ryle, Collected Papers (London, 1971), vol. II, p. 419 
4Richard Robinson, An Atheist's Values (Oxford, 1964). 
5Michael Oakeshott, "Rational Conduct," The Cambridge Journal, vol. IV (1950). 
60akeshott has an entertaining polemic against what he takes to be a prime 
example of the deplorable effort to empty the mind and get rid of conceptions, as 
exemplified in the Victorian design of bloomers, "an extraordinary garment affected 
by girls on bicycles" and touted as the "rational dress" for such occasions (p.4). 
7Qakeshott continues: "'Rational' conduct is acting in such a way that the coher­
en<;e of the world of activity to which the conduct belongs is preserved and possibly 
enhanced" (p. 20). An attractive but somewhat cryptic formula. 
8oavid Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 
1965), p. 114. 
9This label i"s commonly used by economists for analysis of social choices; I am 
using it to fit all cases of rational choice. 
10For an admirably clear and detailed exposition of this mode of analysis see 
R. C. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision (New York, 1965). 
llJames G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958), pp. 137 
ff. The authors do not accept the model. 
12Restriction of the alternatives. to some "reasonable" finite set raises some 
further difficulties about how and when to stop considering further options. 
13To the of:?jecti on that some economic analysis of recommended social action 
ignores considerations of, say, justice, an adherent of cost-benefit analysis will 
characteristically retort that individuals' "preferences" for some actions as more 
than others be treated as modifying their utility functions appropriately. 
14Let a "strategy" for White (in game-theoretical style) denote a complete pol­
icy for playing the game, taking into account all possible replies by Black at every 
juncture. ·If the:re exists an optimal strategy for White (leading invariably to a win or 
a draw), he commits himself to that strategy and plays accordingly. If not, then for 
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every first move by White, Black can adopt a strategy that defeats him. Thus with 
"best play11 on both sides, there must be a single predetermined result (win for one, 
or a draw), the same in each case. For another indirect argument, see Morton D. 
Davis, Game Theory (New York, 1970), pp. 16·18. 
15Based on a discussion in C. H. O'D. Alexander, A Book of Chess, (New York, 
1973), p. 23. 
16Adriaan D. de Groot, Thought and Choice in Chess (The Hague, 1965). The 
author persuaded a number of chess players, including masters, of varying degrees 
of skill, to "think aloud" while examining a number of selected situations chess 
positions. The records thus obtained were the "protocols" (supplemented by subse· 
quent discussion with their producers). 
171 take this expression from a valuable recent book by a grandmaster, which 
interestingly supplements de Groot: Alexander Kotov, Think Like a Grandmaster 
(London, 1971). 
18current efforts to simulate chess playii:ig skill in computer programs sensibly 
ignore cost-benefit analysis, trying instead to incorporate the requisite knowledge 
of tactics and strategy to which I have alluded. Such programs try, although with 
only moderate success so far, to take account of the "patterned perception" and 
reliance upon maxims of play that I have emphasized. · 
19For an account by one of the principal actors, see especially Robert F. Kenn­
edy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, New Ameri· 
can Library, 1969). In Graham T. Allison, Essences of Decision (Boston, 1971) a 
fuller account of the crisis is used to explore some controversial models of exr,>lana­
tion of political decision-making. An essay that I have found particulai:ly helpful is 
Alexander L. George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962," in A.L. George and others, 
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston, 1971). 
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